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Abstract
We provide an extensive and general investigation of the eﬀects on industry per-
formance (proﬁts and social welfare) of exogenously changing the number of ﬁrms in
a Cournot framework. This amounts to an in-depth exploration of the well-known
trade-oﬀ between competition and production eﬃciency. We establish that under scale
economies, welfare is maximized by a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms. Our results shed light on
several theoretical issues and policy debates in industrial organization, including the
relationship between the Herﬁndahl index and social welfare, destructive competition
and natural monopoly. Our analytical approach combines simplicity with generality.
Key words and phrases: Cournot oligopoly, returns to scale, entry, equilibrium
comparative statics.
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There has been a rich and insightful debate in industrial organization about the welfare and
proﬁtability eﬀects of increasing the number of ﬁrms in an industry. While many complex
facets of this fundamental issue remain partly unsettled, the basic compromise at work is
well-known, though still a source of major controversy both among academics and antitrust
practitioners1 . On the one hand, conventional intuition – sometimes wrongly – holds that
increasing the number of ﬁrms reduces monopoly power and allows closer approximation
of the competitive ideal. On the other hand, increasing the number of ﬁrms may result in
reduced ability to take advantage of scale economies.
The relationship between concentration and proﬁt rates has been one of the most active
research areas in empirical industrial organization (e.g. Mueller, 1986). While conventional
intuition holds that per-ﬁrm proﬁt must decline with the number of ﬁrms, interaction be-
tween theoretical and empirical work has over the years uncovered the potential role of several
inter-related factors, including potential collusion, ease of entry, and merger policy. The im-
portance of scale economies has been stressed early on to argue against antitrust-mandated
break-ups of large ﬁrms and for a laisser-faire policy (e.g. Demsetz, 1973).
The welfare implications of market structure have been prominent in the early beginning
of the ﬁeld, Bain (1956). The unquestioned view then was that barriers to entry are respon-
sible for the presence of imperfect competition, which in turn results in sizable welfare losses.
The belief that public policy must correct for this imperfection by removing barriers to en-
try and possibly subsidizing entry had dominated the profession and persisted until quite
recently. Perceptive work by von Weiszacker (1980), Perry (1984), Mankiw and Whinston
(1986) demonstrated that this view was fundamentally ill-founded by showing that if ﬁrms’
conduct is not subject to regulation, then free entry results in an excessive (endogenous)
number of ﬁrms relative to a social optimum. In addition to developing a version of this
result, Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) also show the same conclusion holds with respect to
ﬁrst-best entry regulation (also see von Weiszacker, 1980).
Once the existence of the trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of competition and the cost-
1 The current Microsoft case is a timely reminder of the importance of this issue, albeit with a relatively
new key dimension: Network eﬀects.
1savings of production scale is established, the main issue becomes largely empirical. Indeed,
the empirical literature on the subject is extensive, though somewhat outdated by now.
Several studies in Goldschmid, Mann and Weston (1974) provide empirical evidence and a
general debate on this controversial issue. For instance, Sherer (1974) concludes on the basis
of a detailed empirical study of twelve manufacturing industries that the evidence provides
little support for the conjecture that concentration is the result of a realization of scale
economies. On the other hand, his ﬁndings are controversial (e.g. Brozen, 1973).
The present paper oﬀers a thorough theoretical investigation of the eﬀects on industry
proﬁts and social welfare of exogenously increasing the number of ﬁrms in a Cournot industry
composed of identical ﬁrms. Given the importance that these issues have for a free market
society, the results presented here would be a pre-requisite to any modern empirical work or
formulation of public policy dealing with market structure and social welfare.
An extensive older literature addresses the related questions of the eﬀects of the number
of ﬁrms on industry price and output levels, e.g. Ruﬃn (1973) and Seade (1980)2 . Yet, to
the best of our knowledge, no systematic theoretical analysis of industry proﬁts and social
welfare has been conducted with an exogenous number of ﬁrms.
An important aspect of the paper, from a methodological viewpoint, is its reliance on the
new lattice-theoretic comparative statics approach. We build directly on Amir and Lambson
(2000) who use this same framework to analyse price and output eﬀects. They derive two
main results. The ﬁrst one is that industry price falls (increases) with the number of ﬁrms
if a ﬁrm’s residual inverse demand declines slower (faster) than its marginal cost, globally.3
This is the so-called property of quasi-competitiveness (quasi-anticompetitiveness). Strong
scale economies are required for demand to decline slower than marginal cost, and lead to
the counterintuitive outcome on price. The second result is that per-ﬁrm proﬁt falls with
the number of ﬁrms in both cases.
A complementary methodological feature is our reliance on tight illustrative examples.
These serve a dual purpose. First, they conﬁrm that the given suﬃcient conditions are, in
some sense, critical to the resulting conclusions. Second, they illustrate in a more accessible
2 See also Frank (1973), Okuguchi (1973) and Novshek (1980), among others.
3 This sharp intuition behind many of our main conclusion is only possible with the latice-theoretic approach.
In previous work, other method-imposed assumptions, such as concave proﬁts and decreasing marginal
revenue, prevented such simple and clear-cut economic interpretations based only on critical assumptions.
2manner the interaction between the various eﬀects at work in the comparative statics at
hand. In particular, we present a Main Example (Section 3) which is a blueprint for the entire
paper, in that most eﬀects of interest can be captured by varying the Example parameters.
This example can serve as a pedagogical tool to convey the main ideas of the paper in a
simple and intuitive framework to undergraduate students or policy practitioners.
For industry performance comparisons (Section 4), the quasi-competitive case has two
clear-cut welfare results that are independent of the returns to scale: (i) welfare increases in
the number of ﬁrms whenever per-ﬁrm output does, and (ii) in case of multiple equilibria, the
maximal output equilibrium is the social-welfare maximizing equilibrium. The latter result
vindicates the supremacy of consumer welfare over producer welfare. Otherwise, this case
gives rise to two subcases, depending on the returns to scale in production. In the presence
of economies of scale, industry proﬁts are shown to globally decline with the number of ﬁrms,
while social welfare is generally not monotonic. More precisely, we argue that the slightest
amount of scale economies leads to welfare being decreasing at suﬃciently high number of
ﬁrms. Inversely, under diseconomies of scale, social welfare is globally increasing in the
number of ﬁrms, while industry proﬁts exhibit a tendency to initially increase in the number
of ﬁrms (treated as a real number), starting at monopoly level. (Whether this tendency
leads to duopoly, say, having higher total proﬁt than monopoly depends on the magnitude
of the returns). As an important corollary of the two monotonicity results above, under
constant returns to scale, both conventional beliefs indeed hold: Industry proﬁts fall and
social welfare increases with the number of ﬁrms.
For the quasi-anticompetitive case, monopoly always leads to the highest possible indus-
try proﬁts, with this being the only clear result on industry proﬁts.4 On the other hand,
the welfare outcome is unambiguous: Social welfare always decreases in the number of ﬁrms.
In this case there are strong enough scale economies to overcome all other considerations.
Our conclusions provide a precise theoretical foundation for intuitive beliefs about the
need for a trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of fostering increased competition and the ability
of ﬁrms to exploit scale economies. The conclusions are also fully congruent with some
classical results in partial equilibrium analysis. It is well-known (Ruﬃn, 1973) that, under
4 We provide an informal argument showing that, for intermediate market structures, the cost and revenue
eﬀects move in conﬂicting directions, the latter in a counterintuitive way..
3quasi-competitiveness, Cournot equilibria converge to perfectly competitive equilibria when
average cost is nondecreasing, and that this same convergence fails when average cost is
nonincreasing. Our results show that welfare is monotonically increasing in the former case
(thus converging to ﬁrst-best welfare), but not in the latter. Also see Novshek (1980).
The results presented here may also be invoked to illuminate a number of important
theoretical and public policy debates: See Section 5 where some important corollaries of our
results are presented in various applications. The ﬁrst of these concerns the relationship
between Cournot and perfectly competitive equilibria, as described above.
The second point deals with the comparison of endogenous concentration levels prevailing
under free entry and ﬁrst or second-best socially optimal entry. Mankiw and Whinston
(1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) show that the old belief that free entry leads to
socially too few ﬁrms is invalid under general conditions. Our results provide simple but
important insights into this important issue in addition to clarifying in important ways the
latter authors’ conclusions on the comparison between free and ﬁrst best entry.
The third point addresses the extensive use made by antitrust authorities of the Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman index of concentration under the presumption that the Index is a good inverse
measure of social welfare. Recent theoretical work showed that with a constant number of
ﬁrms, any output transfers across ﬁrms that leave price unchanged must cause the Index
and social welfare to move in the same direction, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Salant and
Shaﬀer (1999). We complement this insight by the observation that with scale economies
and a varying number of ﬁrms, both the Index and welfare decrease with the number of
ﬁrms, when the latter is larger than a threshhold level, which may be one.
The fourth point considers the long-standing concentration/proﬁtability debate, and re-
lates our results to the inconclusive evidence uncovered over the years on this key issue. In
particular, in cases where free entry leads to a completely indeterminate number of ﬁrms
(the quasi-anticompetitive case) or to multiple equilibria with a given number of ﬁrms, any
meaningful correlation between industry characteristics and proﬁts is unlikely.
The ﬁfth point identiﬁes the Cournot model in the quasi-anticompetitive case as an ap-
propriate (noncooperative) framework for modelling the concept of destructive competition
that was prevalent in the old regulation literature (e.g. Sharkey, 1982). Indeed, there is an
4excellent match between the theoretical predictions of the Cournot model in that case and
the stylised facts commonly associated with destructive competition.
The sixth point proposes to deﬁne natural (unregulated) monopoly as an industry where
the socially optimal number of ﬁrms is one, as opposed to the old deﬁnition of (regulated)
natural monopoly based on the inability to improve on costs by subdividing production,
a purely production-based criterion. This new deﬁnition clearly balances the market and
production sides, and is more appropriate in the absence of regulation and contestability.
All these applications emphasize the role of scale economies in engendering a trade-oﬀ
between the market eﬀect and the production eﬃciency eﬀect. They convey the sense that
our simple results form a pre-requisite for a thorough understanding of the issues presented.
2. The Model
The fundamental questions under investigation here can be simply phrased as follows: How
do total equilibrium output (and hence industry price), per-ﬁrm proﬁt, industry proﬁt and
social welfare vary with the exogenously given number of ﬁrms in the industry? We consider
these fundamental questions in the framework of equilibrium comparisons (as in Milgrom
and Roberts, 1994), the exogenous parameter being the integer number of ﬁrms.
We begin with the basic notation. Let P : R+ → R+ be the inverse demand function,
C : R+ → R+ the (common) cost function, A : R+ → R+ the average cost function, and n
the number of ﬁrms in the industry. Let x denote the output of the ﬁrm under consideration,
y the total output for the other (n − 1) ﬁrms, and z the cumulative industry output, i.e.,
z = x+y. At equilibrium, these quantities will be indexed by the underlying number of ﬁrms
n. We explicitly deal with the (possible) nonuniqueness of Cournot equilibria by considering
extremal equilibria. Denote the maximal and minimal points of any equilibrium set by an
upper and a lower bar, respectively. Thus, for instance, zn and zn are the highest and lowest
total equilibrium outputs, with corresponding equilibrium prices p
n and pn, respectively.
Performing comparative statics on equilibrium sets will consist of predicting the direction of
change of these extremal elements as the exogenous parameter varies.
The proﬁt function of the ﬁrm under consideration is
Π(x,y) = xP (x + y) − C (x) (1)
5Alternatively, one may think of the ﬁrm as choosing total output z = x + y, given the
other ﬁrms’ cumulative output y, in which case its proﬁt is given by
e Π(z,y) = Π(z − y,y) = (z − y)P (z) − C (z − y) (2)
Let 4(z,y) denote the cross-partial derivative of e Π with respect to z and y, i.e.,
4(z,y) = −P
0
(z) + C
00
(z − y) (3)
Note that both e Π and 4 are deﬁned on the set ϕ
∧ = {(z,y) : y ≥ 0,z ≥ y}.
The following Standard Assumptions are in eﬀect throughout the paper:
(A1) P (·) is continuously diﬀerentiable and P
0 (·) < 0.
(A2) C (·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on (0,∞) and C
0 (·) > 0.
(A3) There exists b x > 0 such that P (x) < A(x) for all x > b x.
Although convenient, the smoothness assumptions are by no means necessary for our main
results. (A3) simply guarantees that that a ﬁrm’s reaction curve eventually coincides with
the horizontal axis, so that a ﬁrm’s eﬀective outputs, and thus all Cournot equilibrium
outputs, are bounded by some constant, say K , for all n.
The qualitative nature of most of our results hinges entirely on the global sign of ∆, so
that we will distinguish two main cases: ∆ > 0 and ∆ < 0. When ∆ > 0 globally, there will
be two subcases of interest depending on the returns to scale, or the slope of the average
cost curve. This division is already apparent in the upcoming example, which may serve as
a blueprint for the entire paper.
3. Concentration, Returns to Scale and Industry Performance:
The Main Example
We now consider a simple example that provides an excellent and thorough overview of most
of the results derived in this paper.5 As a parameter capturing the returns to scale is varied,
the example can ﬁt the two major cases of analysis of the general model: ∆ < 0 and ∆ > 0.
In the latter case, the example can also capture the two subcases of interest: economies or
5 This example would be very appropriate for the purpose of presenting in a very elementary framework the
essentials of the analysis to undergraduate students or economic practitioners.
6diseconomies of scope. In addition, this example will also be invoked later on to gain further
insight into the tightness of the conditions behind our general results.
Let the inverse demand be linear and the cost function be quadratic6 , i.e.,
P(z) = a − bz and C(x) = cx + dx
2 (4)
with the assumption throughout that a > c > 0 , b > 0 , b + d > 0 .
Since A(x) = c + dx, returns to scale are increasing (decreasing) if d > (<)0. Thus d is
our returns to scale parameter, key to many results below. Furthermore (cf. (3))
∆ = b + 2d R 0 if d R −b/2 (5)
The reaction function is always linear (when strictly positive) and given by r(y) =
a−c−by
2(b+d) .
Thus for any number of ﬁrms n there is always a unique symmetric Cournot equilibrium.
Omitting some lengthy calculations (including solving for the symmetric Cournot equilibrium
via r[(n − 1)xn] = xn ), this equilibrium satisﬁes
xn =
a − c
b(n + 1) + 2d
, πn =
(b + d)(a − c)2
[b(n + 1) + 2d]2 , Wn =
n[b(n + 2) + 2d)](a − c)2
2[b(n + 1) + 2d]2 (6)
Furthermore, if d > −b/2 (or ∆ > 0), the slope of the reaction curve in larger than −1 and
the symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. It is also globally stable in the sense
that best-reply Cournot dynamics converges to this equilibrium, from any initial outputs.
On the other hand, if d < −b/2 (or ∆ < 0), then r0(y) ≤ −1, so that r(y) decreases steeply
and is equal to 0 when y ≥ (a − c)/b .7 For the n-ﬁrm oligopoly, the unique symmetric
equilibrium (with all ﬁrms active) is unstable in the sense that best-reply Cournot dynamics
diverge away from it (Seade, 1980).
It can be veriﬁed that for the unique symmetric equilibrium:
(i) per-ﬁrm output xn is always decreasing in n (cf. Proposition 1b).
6 This speciﬁcation of the demand and cost functions with the restriction d < 0 has already been considered
with diﬀerent motivations in Cox and Walker (1998) and d’Aspremont, Gerard-Varet and Dos-Santos-Ferreira
(2000). Neither study deals with our main issues: industry proﬁts and social welfare.
7 Consequently, there are several other Cournot equilibria, and they can be characterized as follows. With
n being the total number of ﬁrms in the industry, if any m ﬁrms (with m < n) produce the output xm each
(given in (6)), and the remaining n−m ﬁrms produce nothing, the resulting output conﬁguration is clearly
a Cournot equilibrium. To see this, observe that r(mxm) = 0, since mxm ≥ (a − c)/b, as can be easily
checked. In particular, if any one ﬁrm produces the optimal monopoly output x1 = (a−c)/(b+2d), and all
the others produce nothing, we have a Cournot equilibrium. Again, this follows from r(x1) = 0 since x1 ≥
(a−c)/b, and x1 = r(0) clearly. Given the linearity of the reaction curve here, this is easy to see graphically.
7(ii) industry output zn = nxn is increasing in n if d > −b/2 (or ∆ > 0) and decreasing in n
if d < −b/2 (or ∆ < 0) (cf. Propositions 1a and 2a).8
(iii) per-ﬁrm proﬁt πn is always decreasing in n (cf. Propositions 1c and 2c).
It remains to analyse the eﬀects of n on industry proﬁts and social welfare. It is convenient
here to treat the number of ﬁrms as a real variable. For industry proﬁts, we have (with the
computational details left out)
∂(nπn)
∂n
T 0 if and only if n S 1 + 2d/b. (7)
Here, there are two separate cases of interest:
(i) d < 0 : Then industry proﬁts always decrease with the number of ﬁrms, with in particular
monopoly having the largest industry proﬁt.
(ii) d > 0 : Then e n = 1 + 2d/b maximizes industry proﬁts, which thus increase in n when
n < e n and decrease in n when n > e n, starting from any given n. Observe that if d/b < 1/2,
then 1 < e n < 2. Hence, in particular, if e n = 1 (i.e. monopoly is the market structure that
maximizes total proﬁts), industry proﬁts would be globally decreasing in n. But if d is large
enough, i.e., if there are suﬃciently high returns to scale, industry proﬁts will be rising in n
initially, all the way to e n which may be a large number of ﬁrms, but industry proﬁts always
eventually decrease in n (i.e., for n > e n.)
For social welfare, one can easily verify that
∂Wn
∂n
T 0 if and only if nbd T −(b + d)(b + 2d) (8)
Again, there are two separate cases of interest:
(a) ∆ < 0 iﬀ d < −b/2: Welfare always decreases with n (cf. Proposition 10.)
(b) ∆ > 0 iﬀ d > −b/2: Here, there are two diﬀerent subcases of interest.
(i) d > 0 : welfare always increases in n (cf. Proposition 6.)
(ii) if −b/2 < d < 0, then welfare is maximized at n∗ = −(b+d)(b+2d)/bd , increases in
n for n < n∗ and decreases in n for n > n∗ (cf. Proposition 8). Observe that this statement
is true no matter how close d is to 0 (from below)! In other words, the slightest presence of
8 The intuition behind the counter-intuitive case ∆ < 0 is that with more competition, each ﬁrm lowers
output drastically since r0(y) < −1, thereby moving up its steeply declining average cost curve. The resulting
eﬃciency loss is large enough to overcome the downward pressure on price engendered by the increase in
competition. The increase in average cost is passed on to consumers via a higher price.
8(uniform) scale economies causes welfare to be eventually declining in n (i.e., for suﬃciently
large values of n). The parameters of this example can be chosen to make n∗ equal any
desired value from 1 on, while satisfying all the underlying constraints here.
The economic intuition can now be stated concisely and precisely since the main results
hinge mainly on the sign of ∆ = −P 0 + C00, and sometimes also on the returns to scale.
For industry price, there are two eﬀects at work, a market or competition eﬀect captured
by the term −P 0, and a production or scale eﬀect captured by C00. The market eﬀect always
pushes in the intuitive direction that price should fall with the number of ﬁrms. The scale
eﬀect goes in the same direction if and only if costs are convex. When costs are concave, the
overall outcome on price is determined by the relative strength of the two eﬀects. Per-ﬁrm
proﬁt always behave in the intuitive way.
For industry proﬁts, the market eﬀect pushes in the intuitive direction if and only if
industry price is well-behaved ( ∆ > 0). The production eﬀect works in the intuitive direction
if scale economies are present. When the two eﬀects are antagonistic, the outcome depends
on the relative strengths again.
Viewed as the sum of consumer and producer surpluses, social welfare can be discussed
on the basis of the previous assessments. Thus, with ∆ > 0 and diseconomies of scale,
consumer surpluse increases with n, overcoming a possible decrease in producer surplus (the
latter eﬀect being ambiguous). With ∆ < 0, strong scale economies are necessarily present,
and both surpluses decrease wth n. Finally, with ∆ > 0 and economies of scale, consumer
surplus moves up and producer surplus down, with an ambiguous net eﬀect.
In conclusion, this example provides a microcosm for the entire paper. In the remainder,
we present a generalization of the insights illustrated so far, preserving another key role for
this Example in testing the tightness of the suﬃcient conditions given for our various results.
4. A General Cournot Analysis of Industry Performance
This section contains the general analysis of the interplay between market structure or
concentration and scale economies in determining industry performance as reﬂected in price,
outputs, industry proﬁts and social welfare. This amounts to comparing Cournot equilibria
along these characteristics as the number of ﬁrms varies. In an attempt to obtain the broadest
9possible understanding of the issues involved, we provide a series of minimally suﬃcient
conditions for the desired conclusions, combined with tight complementary examples to
shed further light on the relationship between assumptions and conclusions. The proofs
combine analytical simplicity with generality. Nonetheless, we supplement the presentation
with some heuristic arguments whenever it is felt they may provide additional insight.
Methodologically, we make crucial use of the lattice-theoretic comparative statics ap-
proach.9 This allows for very general conclusions relying only on critically needed assump-
tions, thereby leading to clean and tight economic interpretations of the conclusions, as well
as analytical rigor. In the present context, the usual arguments in favor of this approach
become even more pertinent, as the parameter of interest, the number of ﬁrms, is an integer:
See Appendix for a graphical illustration of many important details on this issue.10
While the condition ∆ > 0 is familiar in Cournot theory at least since Hahn (1962), it
has typically been used in conjunction with many other assumptions, such as some form of
concavity of each ﬁrm’s proﬁt in own output, decreasing marginal revenue, etc...The latter
assumptions interfere with a good intuitive understanding of the economic forces at work,
as they are also made for the case ∆ < 0. As shown below, there is a very natural division
of the results here, and it depends only on the global sign of ∆. The latter has a very
simple and appealing interpretation: ∆ > 0 (∆ < 0) means that price, or residual inverse
demand, decreases (increases) faster than marginal cost. Since P
0 < 0, it is clear that the
convexity of C implies 4 > 0 on ϕ. Likewise, strong concavity of C is required for ∆ < 0.
Examples provided below illustrate that ∆ > 0 can hold globally even when the cost function
is everywhere concave, an important subcase of analysis in this paper.
9 In particular, we invoke the general results of Milgrom and Roberts (1994), in addition to Topkis (1978).
More speciﬁc to Cournot oligopoly, we build on the results of Amir and Lambson (2000). See also McManus
(1962) and Roberts and Sonnenschein (1976) for early antecedents.
10The traditional method based on the Implicit Function Theorem and the signing of derivatives can provide
insight for special cases, but is ill-suited for the requisite analysis at hand. The main reason is that it rests
on assumptions (such as concavity and equilibrium uniqueness) that need not be satisﬁed in our general
setting. Furthermore, as these same assumptions are needed in all the otherwise mutually exclusive cases
of analysis, this method prevents a tight intuitive understanding of the economic forces behind each result.
Finally, in the context at hand, as the parameter of interest is an integer, traditional methods have further
drawbacks: See de Meza (1985), Amir and Lambson (2000) and Milgrom and Roberts (1994).
104.1 Equilibrium Price and Outputs
The results of this subsection have been proved in Amir and Lambson (2000). They are
stated here without proof, interpreted and then used in the sequel in looking at industry
proﬁt and social welfare. For a more detailed presentation, the reader is referred to the
above paper. In the Appendix, a graphical illustration of the need for the new comparative
statics is presented, with the conclusion that only extremal equilibria can be unambiguously
compared as the number of ﬁrms varies.11 For any variable of interest, the maximal
(minimal) value will always be denoted by an upper (lower) bar.
Proposition 1 Let 4(z,y) > 0 on ϕ. For each n, there exists a symmetric equilibrium and
no asymmetric equilibria. Let xn be an extremal Cournot equilibrium output.
(a)Industry output zn is nondecreasing in n, and hence price pn is nonincreasing in n.
(b) xn is nonincreasing [nondecreasing] in n if logP is concave [convex and C(·) ≡ 0].
(c)The corresponding equilibrium proﬁt πn is nonincreasing in n.
Thus the Cournot model is quasi-competitive here (Part (a)). The fundamentally needed
assumption is the supermodularity of e Π on ϕ, which is equivalent to ∂2e Π/∂z∂y = ∆ > 0.
This implies that the line segment joining any two points on the graph of the reaction
correspondence r of a ﬁrm must have a slope ≥ −1, which means that, in response to an
increase in rivals’ output, a ﬁrm can never contract its output by more than this increase.
In particular, this precludes downward jumps for r (while allowing for upward jumps).12
The other case is characterized by the assumption 4(z,y) < 0, implying that r has all its
slopes bounded above by −1: as the joint output of the rivals is increased, a ﬁrm optimally
reacts by contracting its output so much that the resulting total output decreases.
Proposition 2 Let 4(z,y) < 0 on ϕ. Then assuming Π(·,y) is quasi-concave, we have:
(a) There is a unique symmetric equilibrium, and it satisﬁes: xn, zn and πn are nonincreas-
ing in n. Hence pn is nondecreasing in n.
(b) For any m with 1 ≤ m < n, the following is an equilibrium for the n-ﬁrm oligopoly:
Each of any m ﬁrms produces xm while the remaining (n − m) ﬁrms produce nothing. All
these Cournot equilibria are invariant in n, in that all entering ﬁrms would produce zero.
(c) There are no other Cournot equilibrium (than those of Parts (a) and (b)).
For this case, we henceforth focus on the symmetric equilibria13 (from Part (a)).
11For unstable equilibria (in the sense of best-reply Cournot dynamics), the price comparative statics is
counter-intuitive (as seen in the Appendix), and this will carry through to other results.
12This property was noticed and exploited in classic papers by McManus (1962) and Roberts and Sonnen-
schein (1976) to establish the existence of Cournot equilibrium in the case of symmetric ﬁrms with convex
cost functions. See Amir and Lambson (2000) for a generalization.
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114.2 Industry Proﬁts and Social Welfare
Here, the eﬀects of an exogenous change in the number of ﬁrms on total proﬁts and social
welfare are investigated. Most of the results below are stated both in a local and in a global
sense, the latter being a direct consequence of the former. Elementary (heuristic) proofs for
the global statement are given in the text, while rigorous proofs for the local statement are
given in Appendix. We emphasize that the latter, while not standard, nonetheless combine
generality with simplicity! For the same reasons as before, we continue to focus on the
two extremal equilibria for all our results, and to separate the analysis of our comparative-
equilibria results into two cases, according to the global sign of ∆.
4.3 The Case ∆ > 0
Recall that ∆ > 0 globally is consistent with both globally increasing and decreasing returns
to scale. We begin with the eﬀects of concentration on industry proﬁts. The local statement
(a) below is more general than the global statement (b). The former requires a rigorous
proof, given in Appendix (A1), while the latter is heuristically proved here with a standard
approach. This separation of proofs applies to most of our main results below.
Proposition 3 Let ∆ > 0 on ϕ. For the extremal equilibria,
(a)Industry proﬁt nπn is globally nonincreasing in n if A(·) is nonincreasing.
(b)nπn ≥ (n + 1)πn+1 for any given n if A(n+1
n xn+1) ≤ A(xn+1).
Proof. We present here a simple heuristic proof of (a). Assuming n is a real and nπn =
zn[P(zn)−A(xn)] is diﬀerentiable in n, one can get
d(nπn)
dn = dzn
dn [P(zn)−A(xn)]+zn[P 0(zn)dzn
dn −
A0(xn)dxn
dn ]. Using the ﬁrst-order condition for a symmetric Cournot equilibrium,
P(zn) − A(xn) + xn[P
0(zn) − A
0(xn)] = 0 (9)
and simplifying, one arrives at
d(nπn)
dn
= xnA
0(xn) + (n − 1)P
0(zn)
dzn
dn
(10)
Now,
d(nπn)
dn ≤ 0 follows from A0(xn) ≤ 0, and dzn
dn ≥ 0 since ∆ > 0 (Proposition 1a).
Here existence of a symmetric equilibrium is not guaranteed for all n without the quasi-concavity assump-
tion, as the best-response may have a downward jump where it skips over the y/(n − 1) lines for some n’s,
thus implying the absence of a symmetric equilibrium for those n’s.
12Since per-ﬁrm proﬁt πn always falls with n, Proposition 3 asks whether πn falls fast
enough to have nπn ≥ (n + 1)πn+1. In interpreting the proposition, it is convenient to
separate the overall eﬀect of an increase in the number of ﬁrms on industry proﬁts into two
distinct parts, as suggested by the above proof. The market or total revenue eﬀect, which
may be isolated by setting A0 = 0, always pushes in the intuitive direction that industry
proﬁts must fall. On the other hand, the production or eﬃciency eﬀect goes in the same
direction if and only if scale economies are present.14
The proof of the result also makes it clear that the conclusion follows when both the
market and the production eﬃciency eﬀects push in the same direction, which suggests the
condition on average cost is suﬃcient but not necessary. It is natural then to ask how critical
this assumption is for this conclusion. Treating the number of ﬁrms as a real number, the
following argument provides a simple but interesting insight: Monopoly is never the proﬁt
maximizing market structure under increasing average cost.
Proposition 4 if A0(·) > 0, industry proﬁt increases from monopoly level as the number of
ﬁrms is increased slightly beyond n = 1.
Proof. Setting n = 1 in (10), we have
h
d(nπn)
dn
i
n=1
= x1A0(x1) > 0.
Observe that this need not mean that duopoly has higher proﬁt than monopoly, as
industry proﬁt may peak between n = 1 and n = 2, with either π1 or 2π2 as the highest
value. This point is illustrated in the Main Example where, for d < b/2, industry proﬁts
may well be globally decreasing in the number of ﬁrms, and are certainly decreasing in n for
n ≥ 2 (see (7)). Thus, Proposition 4 relies crucially on the number of ﬁrms being a real.
Nonetheless, the point made here is important as it shows that the slightest amount
of increasing returns pushes toward industry proﬁts that are increasing in the number of
ﬁrms. Whether this eﬀect actually succeeds in preventing industry proﬁt from being globally
decreasing in the integer number of ﬁrms depends on the strength of the increasing returns,
as suggested by the Main Example. Indeed, from (7), a suﬃcient condition for industry
proﬁt not to be globally decreasing in n is d > b/2.
14By contrast, an n-ﬁrm cartel always has higher optimal proﬁt than the total n-ﬁrm oligopoly proﬁt, since
the cartel, with access to n plants, always has the option of producing nxn at a cost at most equal to the
total cost of the n-ﬁrm oligopoly. There is thus an obvious diﬀerence between a monopoly (with access to
one plant) and a cartel composed of n identical ﬁrms.
13We now turn to the welfare analysis. In case of multiple Cournot equilibria, xn is the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium for the ﬁrms (i.e. leads to the largest producer surplus) and
Pareto-worst equilibrium for consumers (i.e. leads to the smallest consumer surplus), while
xn is Pareto-preferred for consumers and Pareto-worst for the ﬁrms. It is then of interest to
know whether the Cournot equilibria are ranked according to (the Marshallian measure of)
social welfare, deﬁned as
R z
0 P(t)dt − nC(z/n). In other words, is one of the two surpluses
always dominant? The next result (proof in Appendix A1) settles this question in favor of
consumer surplus.
Proposition 5 Let ∆ > 0, and xn and x0
n denote two distinct equilibrium per-ﬁrm outputs
with corresponding social welfare levels Wn and W 0
n. If xn ≤ x0
n, then Wn ≥ W 0
n. Hence, xn
is the social welfare maximizer among all equilibrium per-ﬁrm outputs.
As Proposition 1 shows, the case ∆ > 0 is consistent with both xn increasing and xn
decreasing. The implications of these two possibilities on social welfare are quite diﬀerent,
as reﬂected in the next result. Also, if the demand function does not satisfy either condition
(log-concavity or log-convexity) from Proposition 1(b), then xn will generally not be mono-
tonic in n. Thus, in the following result, the local statement (b) of the welfare result is more
general than the global statement (a).
Proposition 6 Let ∆ > 0 on ϕ. For any n, at an extremal equilibrium,
(a) Social welfare is nondecreasing in n if (i) A(·) is nondecreasing and xn ≥ xn+1, or
(ii) xn ≤ xn+1.
(b) Wn+1 ≥ Wn for a given n if either one of the following holds: (i) A(xn+1) ≤ A(xn),
or (ii) xn ≤ xn+1.
Proof. We prove Part (a) in a simple heuristic way, and leave the proof of Part (b) to
Appendix. Assuming diﬀerentiability of Wn and xn with respect to n, and diﬀerentiating
through Wn =
R zn
0 P(t)dt−znA(xn), one gets dWn
dn = P(zn)dzn
dn − dzn
dn A(xn)−znA0(xn)dxn
dn , or
dWn
dn
= πn + n[P(zn) − C
0(xn)
dxn
dn
] (11)
Using the ﬁrst-order condition for a Cournot equilibrium (9), and simplifying yields
dWn
dn
= xn[A
0(xn)xn −
dzn
dn
P
0(zn)] (12)
For (a), the conclusion follows from (11) since P(zn) ≥ C0(xn) and dxn
dn ≥ 0. For (b), the
conclusion follows from (12) since A0(xn) ≥ 0 and dzn
dn ≥ 0 (from ∆ > 0).
14Since price falls with the number of ﬁrms here, consumer surplus always increases. How-
ever, producer surplus may a priori move either way. So the proposition identiﬁes two
suﬃcient conditions (diseconomies of scale and decreasing per-ﬁrm output, or increasing
per-ﬁrm output) implying that total proﬁt will never decrease enough to overcome the in-
crease in consumer welfare and result in lower social welfare. An alternative way to think of
this result is as follows. Due to the increase in industry output, the sum of consumer surplus
and industry revenue (i.e. total beneﬁt or the total area under the inverse demand up to the
equilibrium output) always increases with the number of ﬁrms. On the other hand, industry
costs may go either way. In this perspective, Proposition 6 identiﬁes conditions ensuring
that industry costs will never increase enough to cause social welfare to overall decrease, in
spite of the increase in total beneﬁt.
Propositions 3 and 6, taken together, imply that conventional wisdom fully prevails for
the case of constant returns to scale, which is widely invoked in industrial organization.
Corollary 7 With linear cost, C(x) = cx, industry proﬁt nπn is nonincreasing in n and
social welfare Wn is nondecreasing in n, for all n, at any extremal equilibrium.
Proof. This follows directly from Propositions 3 and 6, as average cost is constant.
In the presence of scale economies, it is of interest to shed further light on the welfare-
maximizing number of ﬁrms n∗. Treating the number of ﬁrms as a real variable, we can
provide a characteriation and an interesting interpretation of n∗ (cf. (8)).
Proposition 8 Assume ∆ > 0 and global scale economies prevail (i.e. A0(·) ≤ −ε < 0).
Then the welfare-maximizing number of ﬁrms n∗ is ﬁnite and satisﬁes
d[P(zn∗)]
dn
= C
0(xn∗) − A(xn∗) (13)
Proof. It is convenient here to rewrite (12) as
dWn
dn
= x
2
n[A
0(xn) −
1
xn
dzn
dn
P
0(zn)]. (14)
Diﬀerentiating the Cournot equilibrium ﬁrst-order condition P(zn)+xnP 0(zn) = C0(xn) with
respect to n and symplifying, one can evaluate
1
xn
dzn
dn
=
P 0(zn) − C00(xn)
(n + 1)P 0(zn) + znP 00(zn) − C00(xn)
−→ 0 as n → ∞.
15Hence, given the ε such that A0(·) ≤ −ε < 0, there is some N large enough such that
n ≥ N =⇒ − 1
xn
dzn
dn P 0(zn) < ε ≤ −A0(xn), and xn > 0. Then from (14), it follows that
dWn
dn < 0 for all n ≥ N. This implies Wn has a maximum for n ≤ N. Setting dWn
dn = 0 in (14)
yields P 0(zn)dzn
dn = xnA0(xn). (13) then follows from the obvious relations C0(xn) − A(xn) =
xnA0(xn) and
d[P(zn)]
dn = P 0(zn)dzn
dn .
Thus, the socially optimal number of ﬁrms has a simple interpretation: The last ”marginal
ﬁrm” taken in lowers industry price by exactly the diﬀerence between average and marginal
cost at the equilibrium per-ﬁrm output. This equalizes marginal social beneﬁt (the sum
of consumer surplus and ﬁrms’ revenues) with marginal social cost (the production costs).
While the fact that the socially optimal number of ﬁrms is typically ﬁnite in the presence of
ﬁxed costs is well-known, Proposition 8 is nonetheless somewhat surprising as it relies only
on the slightest level of scale economies and not necessarily on any ﬁxed costs.15
The next example shows that if A0 ≤ 0 but A0(0) = 0, Wn may be globally increasing in
n, so that n∗ = ∞. Hence, the assumption A0(0) < 0 in Proposition 8 is crucially needed:16
Example 2. Let P(z) = 2 − z and C(x) = x − .1x3/3, for x ≤
√
30.
Thus A(x) = 1 − .1x2/3 and A0(0) = 0. There is a unique Cournot equilibrium with
xn = 5[n+1−
p
(n + 1)2 − .4]. It can be numerically veriﬁed that Wn is increasing in n.17
4.4 The case ∆ < 0
Strong economies of scale are necessary for ∆ to be globally negative. One feature that is
known to give rise to economies of scale is the presence of (avoidable) ﬁxed-costs. Without
these, one needs a strongly concave cost function for ∆ < 0 to be possible.
In view of the multiplicity of Cournot equilibria described in Proposition 2 (b), free
entry would give rise to every possible integer number of ﬁrms being active, with all ﬁrms
producing equal outputs.18 Furthermore, the equilibrium with m active ﬁrms is also a
15With diseconomies of scale (or A0(·) > 0), (13) holds with a ≤ sign instead of the = sign. In the limit as
n → ∞, both sides of (13) are zero, as should be the case for perfect competition (recall that marginal and
average costs intersect at the latter’s minimum): See Ruﬃn (1971).
16The Main Example also shows that any (uniform) level of scale economies, i.e. the smallest (in absolute
value) d < 0, the conclusion that social welfare globally increases with the number of ﬁrms would fail as
shown by (8): See Point (b)(ii) just below (8).
17Wn = 5x(x + 1 −
q
(x + 1)
2 − .4) − 12.5x2(x + 1 −
q
(x + 1)
2 − .4)2 + 4.1667x(x + 1 −
q
(x + 1)
2 − .4)3.
18This refers to the subgame-perfect equilibria of a two-game of entry where (inﬁnitely many) ﬁrms simulta-
neously decide whether to enter or not at no cost in the ﬁrst stage, and the entrants then engage in Cournot
16Stackelberg equilibrium of a two-stage game where the m ﬁrms act as ﬁrst-movers and the
rest of the ﬁrms as second movers, m ≤ n − 1: Amir and Lambson (2000), Robson (1990).
The only general result on industry proﬁt we can oﬀer here vindicates the conventional
wisdom only about monopoly.
Proposition 9 Let ∆ < 0 on ϕ. Industry proﬁt is highest under a monopoly than under
any other market structure, i.e., π1 ≥ nπn, for all n.
Proof. Since the cost function is concave (hence subadditive), a single ﬁrm has the option
of producing the n-ﬁrm total Cournot output zn = nxn at a cost lower than that of the
n-ﬁrm oligopoly (i.e., C(nxn) ≤ nC(xn)) for any n. The conclusion then follows.
While no counterexample could be found to establish that nπn is not always decreasing
in n, the following argument suggests the conjecture might be false. Total cost is easily seen
to increase in n here, but the revenue part ”moves in the counterintuitive direction”.19
The welfare comparative statics is unambiguous here, due to the strong scale economies:
With more ﬁrms, output per ﬁrm is strongly reduced, resulting in a drastic increase in
average cost. This eﬃciency loss overcomes any other countervailing considerations.
Proposition 10 Let ∆ < 0 on ϕ. Then at the unique symmetric equilibrium, social welfare
Wn is nonincreasing in n, for all n.
Proof. The conclusion follows from (12) since A0(xn) ≤ 0 and dzn
dn ≤ 0 (from ∆ < 0).
Since price increases with the number of ﬁrms here (Proposition 2a), consumer surplus
decreases. Also, as average cost and equilibrium per-ﬁrm output both decline rapidly, equi-
librium total production costs increase rapidly with the number of ﬁrms here. Hence, even if
total proﬁts go up, the increase will never be suﬃcient (recall also that per-ﬁrm proﬁt goes
down) to overcome the fall in consumer surplus.
Corollary 11 Let ∆ < 0 on ϕ. Then monopoly leads both to the highest producer surplus
and to the highest consumer surplus levels.
competition in the second stage upon observing the number of entrants. Lopez-Cunat (1999) analyses the
diﬀerences between this entry process and the one-stage version used by Novshek (1980) among many others.
19Indeed, if it were possible to have nxn ≥ (n + 1)xn+1 while C ≡ 0 (which we know is impossible since
C ≡ 0 clearly implies ∆ > 0), we would have Πn+1 = xn+1P [(n + 1)xn+1] ≥ nxn
n+1P

nxn
n+1 + nxn+1

≥
nxn
n+1P

nxn
n+1 + n nxn
n+1

= nxn
n+1P(nxn) = nΠn
n+1, where the ﬁrst inequality is from the Cournot equilibrium
property and the second from the facts that P is decreasing and nxn ≥ (n + 1)xn+1. It would then follow
that (n + 1)Πn+1 ≥ nΠn: Industry proﬁt would be increasing in the number of ﬁrms!
17Proof. The two statements follow respectively from Propositions 9 and 2a.
In view of the counterintuitive nature of many of the results in the case ∆ < 0, it is
natural to ask whether these results could have any predictive value in describing imperfect
competition in some real-world markets.20 Experimental evidence suggests that unique
(stable) Cournot equilibria are good predictors of actual behavior (Holt, 1986). By contrast,
Cox and Walker (1998) report that in a symmetric Cournot game with three equilibria, a
symmetric unstable one and two boundary or monopoly equilibria (cf. Proposition 2), lab-
oratory behavior reﬂected no regular patterns of play that would support any of the three
equilibria. Rather, play seemed to proceed along irregular cycles around the three equilibria,
meaning that the players continuously exhibited large swings in their output levels, convey-
ing a clear sense of unstable behavior. On the other hand, none of the Nash equilibrium
reﬁnements for one-shot games (such as perfection, properness, strategic stability, etc..., see
e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) can discard Cournot-unstable equilibria, although some
evolutionary learning processes can. Finally, regardless of stability properties, symmetric
Cournot equilibria can always be regarded as being focal (Schelling, 1960.)
4.5 Hybrid Cases
In view of the level of generality of our conclusions, the fact that the entire analysis rests
essentially on one easily checked condition on the global sign of ∆ is a remarkable feature. On
the other hand, there are many demand-cost combinations of interest for which ∆ changes
signs on its domain: Hybrid cases. For these, Cournot equilibria will generally not behave in
the globally monotonic ways we uncovered here. The issue of existence also needs separate
attention then. De Meza (1985) provides an interesting hybrid counterexample highlighting
the diﬀerences between local and global comparative statics and showing that treating n
as a real number can lead to misleading results. Nonetheless, in spite of the nonmonotonic
behavior of some of the variables of interest, some of the insights we developed can still be
useful here. We oﬀer an example.
Example 3. Let P(z) = 1
z+1 and C(x) = 1
2 log(x + 1).
It is easily checked that 4(z,y) changes signs on ϕ (so that our results do not apply here),
20Further discussion of this issue is provided in Section 5 where the characteristics of the Cournot equilibria
here are identiﬁed with the concept of destructive competition, among other applications.
18and that Π(x,y) =
x
x + y + 1
−
1
2
Log (x + 1) is quasi-concave in x, for ﬁxed y. The reaction
curve is r(y) =
p
1 − y2, and the (unique) Cournot equilibrium is given by xn = 1 √
n2−2n+2.
Simple calculations show that while xn and nπn are decreasing in n, for all n, zn and thus
pn are not monotonic in n (details are left out).
Social welfare is given by Wn = log( n √
n2−2n+2 + 1) − n
2 log( 1 √
n2−2n+2 + 1). In particular,
W1 = 1
2 ln2 ' .34657, and W2 = ln
 √
2 + 1

− ln
 
1
2
√
2 + 1

' .34657, so that W2 ' W1.
Thus21 , n∗ = {1,2}: A social planner is indiﬀerent (at least up to 5 decimals) between
monopoly and duopoly as the optimal choice!
5. On some Theoretical and Policy Implications
The results presented here lie at the heart of the modern theory of industrial organization
and can, to some extent, illuminate a number of past as well as present theoretical issues
and public policy debates. In particular, we relate our ﬁndings to the relationship between
Cournot outcomes and perfect competition, the regulation of entry, the welfare content of
the Herﬁndahl index, natural monopoly and destructive competition. Surprisingly, the latter
two notions have not really been linked with Cournot theory in the past. We attempt to ﬁll
this gap below. In some cases, we also present some new results here.
5.1 Relationship to Perfect Competition
Ruﬃn (1971) showed that if the number of ﬁrms is increased with ﬁxed demand22 , Cournot
equilibria converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium under global diseconomies of
scale, but not under global economies of scale. Our conclusions shed some light on this
result by indicating that (i) in the former case, equilibrium welfare converges monotonically
to ﬁrst-best welfare, and (ii) in the latter case, although industry proﬁts and per-ﬁrm output
both monotonically converge to zero, welfare does not increase to ﬁrst-best welfare, due to
ﬁrms producing at increasing (and in the limit, maximal) average cost. Here, ﬁrst-best
welfare would involve one ﬁrm producing the entire output and pricing at marginal cost.23
21In fact, viewing n as a real variable, it can be shown that Wn is single-peaked in n and achieves its
maximum at n ' 1.36.
22See Novshek (1980) for the other approach, where demand is replicated.
23The planner’s objective is then max{
R nx
0 P(t)dt − nC(x) : n ≥ 1,x ≥ 0}. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
P(nx) = C0(x) and xP(nx) = C(x). These imply that marginal and average cost are equal, as is well-known
195.2 Free versus Socially Optimal Entry
Perry (1984), Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) put to rest
a long-standing belief that free-entry leads to insuﬃcient competition by showing that the
opposite conclusion holds under general assumptions, using a two-stage game where ﬁrms
decide upon entry in the ﬁrst period, and then compete a la Cournot in the second period.
The comparison benchmark is second-best social optimum in that the regulator controls
ﬁrms’ entry decisions but not their market conduct. Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) diﬀers
from the other two papers in that costless entry is assumed, and two extra results are
established: (i) with convex costs, free entry is excessive relative to the ﬁrst-best level, where
the regulator also controls pricing or market conduct, see Footnote 24 (and von Weiszacker,
1980) and (ii) the ﬁrst and second-best levels of entry are generally not comparable.
Our welfare results indicate that some of Suzumura and Kiyono’s conclusions are not
really instructive, and potentially misleading. Indeed, with diseconomies of scale, Cournot
equilibrium welfare increases monotonically with the number of ﬁrms to the ﬁrst-best level,
so that both the ﬁrst and the second-best socially optimal numbers of ﬁrms are inﬁnite (for
the former, see Footnote 24.) The free-entry number of ﬁrms is also inﬁnite24 , so that all
three entry levels are actually equal in a trivial way.
With (strict) economies of scale25 , the second-best socially optimal number of ﬁrms is
ﬁnite, and equal to n∗ (which is 1 if ∆ < 0), the ﬁrst-best is always 1 (see footnote 24),
while the free-entry number is inﬁnite (see Footnote 25). Hence, free entry obviously leads
to socially excessive entry under both criteria. Furthermore, the level of entry is at least
as high under second-best than under ﬁrst-best regulation.26 Thus our results substantially
clarify and extend the analysis of Suzumura and Kiyono (1987).
for a ﬁrst-best solution. In particular, the ﬁrst-best number of ﬁrms is then 1 if A0 < 0 and ∞ if A0 > 0.
24The latter follows from the fact that Cournot equilibria are intersections of r with the rays y/(n−1), and
(i) the fact that r has all its slopes greater than −1, if ∆ > 0, or (ii) the fact that r is continuous if a ﬁrm’s
proﬁt is quasi-concave in own output (whether ∆ < 0 globally or not).
25These may also prevail over the relevant range of operation regardless of the properties of the ”variable”
cost function in the case of costly entry (with the entry cost acting as a ﬁxed cost). Hence, our conclusions
here may also apply when entry is costly.
26Both the latter statements are actually new results here, as Suzumura and Kiyono assume convex costs in
the comparison between the free-entry and the ﬁrst-best outcomes.
205.3 The Herﬁndahl Concentration Index and Welfare
The Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (or HHI) of industry concentration, deﬁned as a (normal-
ized) sum of the squares of the ﬁrms’ market shares, is the most often used quantitative
assessment of industry concentration. In particular, the value of the HHI constitutes the
primary indicator for antitrust authorities of market power and of the likelihood of overt
or tacit collusion in a given market. The HHI is also one of the main elements of the 1982
Merger Guidelines27 in determining whether a proposed merger is to be allowed.
Underlying the extensive reliance of economic law on this measure is a fundamental
belief that social welfare and the HHI are always inversely related (see e.g. Dansby and
Willig, 1979). Yet, this belief has recently been challenged by theoretical studies based
on the Cournot model. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) establish that, with a ﬁxed number of
(nonidentical) ﬁrms, whenever industry output is unchanged folowing individual ﬁrm output
changes, social welfare and the HHI must change in the same direction. Salant and Shaﬀer
(1999) provide further insight into this result in the case of constant unit costs by showing
that both welfare and the HHI increase if the variance of the unit costs increases in a mean-
preserving way. Also see Daughety (1990).
The present paper sheds further light on this issue by considering the eﬀects of changing
the number of ﬁrms instead. Given the symmetry assumption, the HHI with n ﬁrms here
is clearly given by (a constant factor of) 1/n. Hence, the HHI decreases if and only if the
number of ﬁrms increases. On the other hand, our results indicate that in the presence of
scale economies (with A0 < 0), social welfare decreases if the number of ﬁrms exceeds some
socially optimal level n∗. Thus, both the HHI and welfare decrease whenever n increases
beyond n∗. In particular, in industries where n∗ = 1, the two measures would always produce
conﬂicting prescriptions as the number of ﬁrms increases.
This conclusion clearly suggests that the HHI should be augmented by some measure
of economies of scale in the industry that would allow appropriate balancing between the
legitimate fears of market power and the desire for production eﬃciency.
27For some historical backround on these Guidelines and an exchange of views among experts, see the
Symposium in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 1, 1987.
215.4 Concentration and Proﬁtability
One of the most extensive debates in industrial organization has revolved around the al-
leged positive relationship between market concentration and proﬁts. While the majority
view ended up with a belief that a weak correlation exists, the issue remains somewhat
controversial. In spite of the simplicity of our framework, our results suggest new possible
theoretical explanations of an elementary nature as to why this issue turned out to be so
complex. Consider a two-stage game of free entry followed by Cournot competition amongst
the entrants. First, the possible multiplicity of Cournot equilibria leads to diﬀerent entry
levels or diﬀerent equilibria for the same entry level. Either way, proﬁts per-ﬁrm will diﬀer.
Second, our results conﬁrm in a general way that scale economies should imply a more
pronounced level of this correlation (Demsetz, 1974, Dewey, 1976 and Lambson, 1987): Since
industry proﬁts increase with concentration, per-ﬁrm proﬁts increase at an increasing rate
(i.e. πn ≥
(n+1)
n πn+1). Conversely, if with diseconomies of scale, we have πn ≤
(n+1)
n πn+1, the
correlation between proﬁts and concentration is more likely to be weak.28
Third, with strong scale economies (∆ < 0), the free-entry number of ﬁrms is fully inde-
terminate. In particular, with no entry cost, any number of ﬁrms is possible in a subgame-
perfect equilibrium, thus leading to many possible proﬁt levels! Postulating that the actual
number of ﬁrms is determined in part by historical and other random events in such markets,
no clear correlation could be expected between proﬁts and industry characteristics.
5.5 Destructive Competition
Destructive competition was a recurrent theme in older case and empirical studies of regu-
lated industries, particularly those in the transportation sector such as railroad and trucking
(see Sharkey (1982) for a historical account). It is typically associated with a combination
of industry characteristics, such as strong economies of scale (often due to large ﬁxed costs),
large productive capacity, relatively easy entry, and ill-guided government subsidies. The
symptoms of destructive competition in such industries include high levels of market in-
stability, excessive capacity and widespread price discrimination, often leading to frequent
28Furthermore, three other important factors of a more dynamic nature contribute to the higher correlation
in the case of economies of scale: Mergers are more likely to be sought and to be allowed, entry by new ﬁrms
is more diﬃcult (in particular if ﬁxed costs are sizable), and collusion is thus more likely.
22changes in regulatory regimes, including entry regulation.
Sharkey (1982) develops a cooperative game-theoretic approach to model destructive
competition, deﬁning industry stability by the nonemptiness of the core. The results here
suggest a simple and natural alternative within the noncooperative paradigm: In the abs-
cence of any regulatory interference, destructive competition can be fruitfully modelled by
Cournot competition under the assumption that ∆ is globally negative. Indeed, increases
in competition from any pre-existing level, including in particular monopoly, result in lower
consumer welfare, per-ﬁrm proﬁt and social welfare. Thus higher competition is unambigu-
ously detrimental to all economic agents, with even unregulated monopoly emerging as the
best among market outcomes. Furthermore, and more strikingly, some aspects of reported
market instability in industries thought to have undergone phases of destructive competi-
tion may be instructively linked to the indeterminacy in the number of active ﬁrms and the
unstable nature of the Cournot equilibria (in the sense of divergence of best-reply dynamics),
both of which are characteristics of the case ∆ globally negative (see Section 4.4.)
5.6 Natural Monopoly
Following various attempts, Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) provided the ﬁnal deﬁnition of
natural monopoly: An industry with a subadditive cost function. This is the least restrictive
property of a cost function that captures the notion that any amount of ﬁnal output is
cheaper to produce by one ﬁrm, or, in other words, subdividing production cannot possibly
save on costs. This deﬁnition completely ignores the demand side of the market, which is
justiﬁed in light of two special features that were dominant in the economic scene two decades
ago. The ﬁrst, reﬂecting the prevalent public policy view of the times, is that monopolies
are to be regulated anyway, so that market conduct is not really an issue, leaving production
eﬃciency as the primary concern. The second, a theoretical belief, is that if an industry
has a downward-sloping average cost curve and the market is contestable, the only stable
conﬁguration will involve a single ﬁrm pricing at average cost, resulting in zero proﬁts.
Subsequently, a near-conscensus emerged, recognizing the limited real-life validity of
contestable markets29 , and a wave of deregulation originating in the US and the UK swept
29In a book review of Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), Spence (1983) oﬀered an eloquent account of the
currently prevailing view on contestable markets. He concludes that the beneﬁts of this theory lie in its
23through the industrialized world. In view of the need to incorporate the demand side of the
market now in a revised deﬁnition of natural monopoly, the analysis of the present paper
suggests an obvious alternative: An unregulated monopoly is natural if social welfare Wn is
maximized by n = 1. According to our results, this would require scale economies of suﬃcient
magnitude over the relevant range, but not necessarily that ∆ be globally < 0. Recall that
the Main Example shows that n∗ can be equal to 1 for an industry for which ∆ > 0 globally.
This deﬁnition is clearly more restrictive than the old one30 , as it incorporates the market
or demand side of the industry. In other words, it strikes a socially optimal balance between
the detrimental eﬀects of concentration and the cost-saving eﬀects of size.
More generally, a natural n∗-ﬁrm oligopoly can be analogously deﬁned by n∗ = argmaxn Wn.
If ∆ < 0, Proposition 10 implies that n∗ must necessarily be equal to 1. Hence, n∗ > 1 is
not compatible with ∆ < 0 globally. On the other hand, it is compatible with ∆ > 0 and
with ∆ not having a uniform sign on all its domain.
5.7 Merger Policy
Proposition 3 says that with scale economies, there are industry-wide gains to mergers.
However, according to Cournot theory on mergers, in a unilateral merger, these gains are
generally appropriated by nonparticipating ﬁrms, except in near-monopolization cases.31
An important aspect of the 1984 revisions of the Merger Guidelines is their novel con-
sideration of cost eﬃciency: mergers that are likely to raise prices will be allowed if the
merging ﬁrms can demonstrate by ”clear and convincing evidence” that the merger will lead
to signiﬁcant cost savings or eﬃciency beneﬁts. In practice, this clause has been exploited by
candidate ﬁrms to secure approval by overstating uncertain future cost gains. Yet, ignoring
the important veriﬁcation and burden-of-proof issues here, our conclusions are certainly in
favor of this amendment to the Guidelines for industries with known scale economies, and
suggest that the extent of scale economies in the industry should be taken into account, as
opposed to more ﬁrm-speciﬁc claims of technological and organizational synergies.
thorough analysis of cost functions, and not in its empirical relevance as a theory of market structure.
30Scale economies of any magnitude imply the subadditivity of the cost function, but not vice-versa.
31See e.g. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Fauli-Oller (1997).
24REFERENCES
Amir R., and V. E. Lambson (2000), “On the Eﬀects of Entry in Cournot Markets,”
Review of Economic Studies, to appear.
d’Aspremont, C., R. Dos Santos Ferreira, L.-A. Gerard-Varet (2000), Contestability
and the Indeterminacy of Free-Entry Equilibria, Japanese Economic Review, to appear.
Bain, J. (1956), Barriers to New Competition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Baumol, W., J. C. Panzar and R. Willig (1982), ”Contestable Markets and the Theory
of Industry Structure”, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York.
Brozen, Y. (1973), ”Concentration and Proﬁts: Does Concentration Matter?” in J.F.
Weston and S. Ornstein, eds. The Impact of Large Firms on the US Economy, Lexing-
ton Books, 59-70.
Cox, J. and M. Walker (1998), ”Learning to Play Cournot Duopoly Strategies”, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 36, 141-161.
Daughety, A. (1990), ”Beneﬁcial Concentration”, American Economic Review, 80,
1231-37.
de Meza, D. (1985), ”A Stable Cournot-Nash Industry Need not be Quasi-
Competitive”, Bulletin of Economic Research, 37, 153, 156.
Demsetz, H. (1973), “Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy, Journal
of Law and Economics, 16, 1-10.
Demsetz, H. (1974), “Two Systems of Belief about Monopoly,” in H. Goldschmid et
al., eds., Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, Boston: Little, Brown, 164-84.
Dewey, D. (1976), “Industrial Concentration and the Rate of Proﬁt: Some Neglected
Theory,” Journal of Law and Economics, 19, 67-78.
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1990), ”Asset Ownership and Market Structure in
Oligopoly”, RAND Journal of Economics, 21, 275-292.
Fauli-Oller, R. (1997), ”On Merger Proﬁtability in a Cournot Setting”, Economics
Letters, 54(1), 75-79.
Frank, C. R. (1965), ”Entry in a Cournot Market”, Review of Economic Studies, 32,
245-250.
Goldschmid, H., H. M. Mann and J.F. Weston (1974), eds., Industrial Concentration:
The New Learning, Boston: Little, Brown.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991), Game Theory, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Hahn, F. (1962), The Stability of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution, Review of Economic
Studies, 29, 329-221.
25Holt, C. (1995), ”Industrial Organization: A Survey of the Results of Laboratory
Experiments”, in Handbook of Experimental Economics, A. Roth and J. Kagel eds.,
Princeton University Press.
Lambson, V. E. (1987), “Is the Concentration-Proﬁt Correlation Partly an Artifact of
Lumpy Technology?” American Economic Review, 77, 731-733.
Lopez-Cunat, J. M. (1999), One-Stage and Two-Stage Entry Cournot Equilibria, In-
vestigaciones Economicas, 23(1), 115-28.
MacManus, M. (1962), ”Number and Size in Cournot Equilibrium”, Yorkshire Bulletin
of Economic and Social Research, 14, 14-22.
Mankiw, N.G. and Whinston, M. D. (1986), ”Free Entry and Social Ineﬃciency”, Rand
Journal of Economics, 17, 48-58.
de Meza, D. (1985), ”A Stable Cournot-Nash Industry Need not be Quasi-
Competitive”, Bulletin of Economic Research, 37, 153-156.
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1994), ”Comparing Equilibria”, American Economic Re-
view, 84, 441-459.
Mueller, D. (1986), Profts in the Long Run, Cambridge University Press, New-York.
Novshek, W. (1980), ”Cournot Equilibrium with free entry”, Review of Economic
Studies, 47, 473-486.
Novshek, W. (1985), ”On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium”, Review of Economic
Studies, L II, 85-98.
Okuguchi, K. (1973), ”Quasi-Competitiveness and Cournot Oligopoly”, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 40, 145-148.
Perry, M. (1984), ”Scale Economies, Imperfect Competition and Public Policy”, Jour-
nal of Industrial Economics, 32, 313-330.
Roberts, J. and H. Sonnenschein (1976), ”On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
without Concave Proﬁt Functions”, Journal of Economic Theory, 13, 112-117.
Robson, A. (1990), ”Stackelberg and Marshall”, American Economic Review, 80, 69-
82.
Ruﬃn, R. J. (1971), ”Cournot Oligopoly and Competitive Behavior”, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 38, 493-502.
Salant, S. and G. Shaﬀer (1999): “Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot
Equilibrium”, American Economic Review, 89, 585-604.
Schelling, T. (1960), The Strategy of Conﬂict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA.
26Seade, J. (1980a), ”On the Eﬀects of Entry”, Econometrica, 48, 479-489.
Sharkey (1982), The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, U.K.
Sherer, F.M. (1974), Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in H. Gold-
schmid et al. eds., Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, Boston: Little, Brown.
Spence, M. (1983), ”Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A
Review Article”, Journal of Economic Literature, 21(3), 981-90.
Suzumura, K. and K. Kiyono (1987), ”Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare”, Review
of Economic Studies, L IV, 157-167.
Topkis, D. (1978), ”Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice, Operations Re-
search, 26, 305-321.
von Weiszacker, C. (1980), ”A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry”, Rand Journal
of Economics, 11, 399-420.
6. Appendix
Here, we provide (A1) a graphical illustration of the beneﬁts of our approach to equilibrium
comparisons when ∆ > 0 and there are multiple equilibria, and (A2) the formal proofs.
(A1) Comparing Equilibria. The following discussion refers to Figure 1. With ∆ > 0,
the reaction curve r can never decrease at a rate larger than −1. With n ﬁrms, the Cournot
equilibria are the intersections of the reaction curve with the line y/(n−1). The number of
equilibria is thus 1 for n = 1 and n = 4, 3 for n = 2, and 5 for n = 3. It is easy to see that:
1) For the extremal equilibria, industry output zn increases with n (to see this, simply
draw lines of slope −1 through these equilibria and observe the outward shifts.)
2) The motion of zn is generally indeterminate for the middle equilibria since a may go to
b,c, or d! On the other hand, if there were only one middle equilibrium for both n = 2 and
n = 3, then zn would actually decrease for this unstable equilibrium, so that price would
increase as we go from 2 to 3 ﬁrms! More generally, the comparative statics of unstable
equilibria goes opposite that of the extremal equilibria. In particular, price increases with
n. Furthermore, since a ﬁrm’s rivals’ total output, yn, decreases with n at an unstable
equilibrium, per-ﬁrm proﬁts also increase with n at such equilibria.
273) Most of the other comparisons of interest (industry proﬁt and welfare) depend on the
previous two points, as seen in our proofs. Thus, dealing only with the extremal equilibria,
one avoids a lot of indeterminacy in the comparative statics.
4) Even with the artifact of treating n as a real variable, the implicit function theorem
approach cannot be justiﬁed in dealing with (say) dxn/dn (add to this that r need not even
be continuous in general). In addition, signing dxn/dn in hybrid cases (where ∆ is not
uniformly signed) can be misleading (de Meza, 1985).
(A2) Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 3b. Let xn be an extremal Cournot equilibrium, and consider
πn = xn {P(nxn) − A(xn)}
≥ n+1
n

xn+1P

n+1
n xn+1 + (n − 1)xn

− A(n+1
n xn+1)
	
≥ n+1
n xn+1

P

n+1
n xn+1 + (n − 1)n+1
n xn+1

− A(n+1
n xn+1)
	
= n+1
n xn+1

P [(n + 1)xn+1] − A(n+1
n xn+1)
	
≥ n+1
n xn+1 {P [(n + 1)xn+1] − A(xn+1)}
= n+1
n πn+1
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the Cournot equilibrium property, the second from
the facts that P is decreasing and nxn ≤ (n + 1)xn+1 (Proposition 1a), and the third from
the fact that A(n+1
n xn+1) ≤ A(xn+1). Multiplying across by n gives the conclusion.
The global statement follows directly from the local statement.
Proof of Proposition 4. With z denoting industry output, industry proﬁt is given by
Πn(z) = z[P(z) − A(z/n)]. Since for ﬁxed z, Πn(z) is increasing in n if A0 > 0, the result
follows from the envelope theorem, as monopoly proﬁt π1 = maxz Π1(z).
Proof of Proposition 5. Since ∆ > 0 or P 0(z) − C00(z − y) < 0 on ϕ, the function
W(z) ,
R z
0 P(t)dt − nC(z/n) is concave in z, since W 00(z) = P 0(z) − 1
nC00(z/n).. Now,
consider
W 0
n − Wn =
R z0
n
0 P(t)dt − nC(z0
n/n) − [
R zn
0 P(t)dt − nC(zn/n)]
= W(z0
n) − W(zn)
≥ W 0(z0
n)(z0
n − zn) , since W is concave.
= [P(z0
n) − C0(z0
n/n)]n(x0
n − xn)
≥ 0, since x0
n ≥ xn.
28The second statement of the lemma follows directly.
Proof of Proposition 6b. To prove Part (b)(i), consider:
Wn+1 − Wn =
R zn+1
0 P(t)dt − zn+1A(xn+1)
	
−
R zn
0 P(t)dt − znA(xn)
	
=
R zn+1
zn P(t)dt − zn+1A(xn+1) + znA(xn)
≥ (zn+1 − zn)P(zn+1) − zn+1A(xn+1) + znA(xn)
= zn+1 [P(zn+1) − A(xn+1)] − zn [P(zn+1) − A(xn)]
≥ zn+1 [P(zn+1) − A(xn+1)] − zn [P(zn+1) − A(xn+1)]
= (zn+1 − zn)[P(zn+1) − A(xn+1)] ≥ 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that P(·) is decreasing, the second from the
assumption A(xn) ≥ A(xn+1), while the last follows from the facts that zn+1 ≥ zn (since
∆ > 0) and xn+1 is a symmetric Cournot equilibrium.
To prove Part (b)(ii), we begin with two preliminary observations. First, the function
Vn(x) ,
R nx
0 P(t)dt−nC(x) is concave in x for each n since V 00
n (x) = n[nP 0(nx)−C00(x)] < 0,
as a result of ∆ > 0. Second, since zn+1 = (n + 1)xn+1 and P is decreasing,
Z zn+1
0
P(t)dt =
Z nxn+1
0
P(t)dt +
Z zn+1
nxn+1
P(t)dt ≥
Z nxn+1
0
P(t)dt + xn+1P(zn+1). (15)
Now, consider,
Wn+1 − Wn =
R zn+1
0 P(t)dt − (n + 1)C(xn+1)
	
−
R zn
0 P(t)dt − nC(xn)
	
≥ xn+1P(zn+1) − C(xn+1) +
R nxn+1
0 P(t)dt − nC(xn+1)
	
−
R nxn
0 P(t)dt − nC(xn)
	
= πn+1 + Vn(xn+1) − Vn(xn)
≥ πn+1 + V 0
n(xn+1)(xn+1 − xn)
= πn+1 + n[P(nxn+1) − C
0(xn+1)](xn+1 − xn) ≥ 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (15), the second from the concavity of Vn in x, and
the last from the facts that P(nxn+1) ≥ P[(n + 1)xn+1] ≥ C
0(xn+1) and xn+1 ≥ xn.
Proof of Proposition 10. Consider (with zn ≥ zn+1 here, since ∆ < 0):
29Wn − Wn+1 =
R zn
0 P(t)dt − znA(xn)
	
−
R zn+1
0 P(t)dt − zn+1A(xn+1)
	
=
R zn
zn+1 P(t)dt − znA(xn) + zn+1A(xn+1)
≥ (zn − zn+1)P(zn) − znA(xn) + zn+1A(xn+1)
= zn [P(zn) − A(xn)] − zn+1 [P(zn) − A(xn+1)]
≥ zn [P(zn) − A(xn)] − zn+1 [P(zn) − A(xn)]
= (zn − zn+1)[P(zn) − A(xn)] ≥ 0
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that P(·) is decreasing, the second from the
facts that xn ≥ xn+1 and A(·) is nonincreasing (the latter follows since ∆ < 0 requires
concavity of C), and the last from the fact that zn ≥ zn+1(since ∆ < 0).
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